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RICARDO'S THEORY OF PROFIT 
AND THE THIRD EDITION OF THE PRINCIPLES 
BY 
JOHN B. DAVIS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
David Ricardo's "On Machinery" chapter continues to interest theo-
rists and historians of economic thought (B1aug 1958, Hollander 1979, 
Kurz 1984, Samuelson, 1988, 1989, Morishima 1989, Negishi 1990). 
Yet the addition of the chapter to the third edition of Ricardo's Princi-
ples of Political Economy and Taxation arguably overturns much of 
the view for which Ricardo is so well known (Davis 1989). In the 
added chapter Ricardo allows, contrary to his original view in the first 
two editions, that the introduction of machinery is indeed injurious to 
the class of laborers. More interestingly, because machinery substi-
tutes for labor, wages cannot rise and profits are no longer threatened 
by rising rents. Effectively the contest between capitalists and land-
lords of the first two editions of the Principles is replaced in the final 
edition by one between capitalists and laborers. However, not only 
does the "On Machinery" chapter substantially change the distribution-
al argument customarily attributed to the Principles, but it also permits 
an examination of Ricardo's thinking about distribution in two distinct, 
but related frameworks. The discussion here compares the distribu-
tional analysis in the first two editions with that of the third to explain 
the general nature of the Ricardo's theory of profit. It does so by 
providing a novel interpretation of Ricardo's characterization of profit 
as a residual, and by emphasizing the historical context in which dis-
tribution occurred in the beginning of the nineteenth century. 
II. THE DISTRIBUTIONAL ACCOUNT OF THE FIRST TWO 
EDITIONS 
It is appropriate to begin with Ricardo's view of wages, on account 
of the special treatment wages receive in the first two editions of the 
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Principles. Similarly to his analysis of the values of commodities wag~s are said to. be det::mined by the cost of production (or repro~ 
ductton) of labor Itself: Labour, like all other things which are pur-
chased .and sold, and which may be increased or diminished in quanti-
ty, has Its natural and its market price. The natural price of labour is 
that price which is necessary to enable the labourers, one with another, 
to subsist and to perpetuate their race, without either increase or dimi-
nution" (Ricardo I, p. 93). This recalls Ricardo's assertion that the 
mass of commodities may "be increased in quantity by the exertion of 
human industry," and "multiplied without any assignable limit" (ibid., 
p. 12). Yet there is an additional element in Ricardo's account of 
wages. The natural price of labor, he asserts, also depends on "the 
quantity of food, necessaries, and conveniences become essen-
tial...from habit" (ibid., p. 93). More fully, "it is not to be understood 
that the natural price of labour, estimated in food and necessaries, is 
absolutely fixed and constant. It varies at different times in the same 
country, and very materially differs in different countries. It essential-
ly depends on the habits and customs of the people" (ibid., pp. 96-97). 
That labor's requirements may vary across time and place suggests 
that the idea that labor possesses a cost of production understandable 
in technical or natural terms is severely limited. Indeed, it suggests 
that Ricardo's reference to the "natural price of labour" borders on be-
ing misleading, since reference to a people's "habits and customs" 
clearly implies a social dimension exists in the determination of the 
value of labor. However, this theme regarding wages in the early 
Principles is not significant in the overall distributional analysis Ric-
ardo originally develops, where variations in the relative shares of na-
tional income stem only from further extension of the margin of culti-
vation. In the first two editions of the Principles, then, the price of 
labor is the natural price of a commodity that may generally be "multi-
plied without any assignable limit." 
With rent one encounters a significantly different sort of treatment. 
Ricardo explicitly distinguishes his understanding of rent from Smith's 
cost of production account in insisting that rent is not a cause of a 
good's exchangeable value, as is the amount of labor required for its 
production: "If the high price of com were the effect, and not the 
cause of rent, price would be proportionately influenced .as rents were 
high or low, and rent would be a component part of pn~e. But that 
com which is produced by the greatest quantity of labour IS ~e regula-
tor of the price of corn; and rent does not and cannot enter III ~e least 
degree as a component part of its price" (ibid., p. 77) .. Rent Is.an ef-
fect of the level of the com price, not a cause of that pnce, and IS thus 
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price determined rather than price determining. In the second edition 
of the Principles Ricardo adds a note to this passage emphasizing his 
departure from Smith: "The clearly understanding of this principle is, 
I am persuaded, of the utmost importance to the science of political 
economy" (ibid., p. 77). He then goes on in the text itself to add that 
his understanding of rent overturns Smith's conclusion that the value 
of a commodity cannot be determined by the comparative quantity of 
labor necessary for its production when land has been appropriated, 
and thus to reject what has since been termed the "adding-up" ap-
proach to the value of a commodity, whereby rent, wages, and profits 
are each a "component part" of the value of a commodity. 
It should be emphasized that Ricardo's cost of production theory of 
the value of commodities does not proceed via the Smithian "adding-
up" approach, because in Ricardo's view there is something signific-
antly different in the determination of rent than is involved in the de-
termination of wages. Land earns a rent according to the level of the 
price of com, and rent is not tied to the cost of production of land, as 
wages are tied to the cost of production of labor. Indeed, while labor 
is understood to be continuously reproduced, and thus rewarded in 
terms of the inputs necessary to that reproduction, land is not produced 
or reproduced, and is not seen to result from some combination of 
inputs. Ricardo insists on all this at the very outset of his discussion 
of rent in his characterization of land itself. "Rent is that portion of 
the produce of the earth, which is paid to the landlord for the use of 
the original and indestructible powers of the soil" (ibid., p. 67). In the 
Essay on Profits it had been the "original and inherent power of the 
land" (Ricardo IV, p. 18 n). Land, simply, is not the sort of resource 
that "can be increased in quantity by the exertion of human industry," 
so that its reward must be determined differently than the rewards to 
those inputs to production that can be so produced. 
Ricardo's account of rent, of course, followed the analysis devel-
oped in the work of Malthus, West, and Torrens. With the growth of 
population and the accumulation of stock, the margin of com produc-
tion is continually extended, so that land of a quality inferior to that 
already in production is continually brought into use. Given that land 
is "not unlimited in quantity and uniform in quality" (Ricardo I, p. 70), 
the last land brought into production only generates a return sufficient 
in the value of the com produced to pay the wages of labor employed 
upon it plus a return to the capital advanced to pay those wages. This 
last land earns no rent. Indeed, since the labor required to produce a 
given quantity of com upon it exceeds that necessary for producing the 
same quantity of com on land of higher quality, the better land sells 
• 
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the same quantity of corn at a value exceeding its labor content cost of 
production, and so earns a rent. 
In contrast to his more naturalistic cost of production account of 
wages, then, Ricardo's account of the return to land emphasizes social 
factors, namely, the institutions of the early nineteenth century system 
of land tenure and the political arrangements in Parliament and e1se-
,:here that .sustained the economic position of landlords. Not empha-
sIzed by RIcardo, but no less a part of the social character of land at 
the time that he wrote, was the fact that though agricultural land pos-
sessed economic value, it was still not fully a commodity in the sense 
of being freely purchased and sold. At the beginning of the nineteenth 
century most agricultural land still changed hands largely through a 
system of inheritance. Ricardo presumably did not emphasize the 
incomplete commodity status of this land because he principally un-
derstood commodities to be those items that might be "increased in 
quantity by the exertion of human industry." We wiII see, however, 
that this aspect of land can play an important role in the analysis of 
Ricardo's theory of profit across the editions of the Principles. 
Turning to Ricardo's analysis of profits itself, it should first be not-
ed that Ricardo originally views profit as a residual after wages and 
rents are determined, rather than a return to capital per se. In the 
important case of profits in farming, he asserts, "The remaining quan-
tity of the produce of the land after the landlord and labourers are 
paid, necessarily belongs to the farmer, and constitutes the profits of 
his stock" (ibid., p. 112). An analysis of profit for Ricardo, therefore, 
is not a matter of explaining what profit is (where wages are the cost 
of producing labor's consumption goods, and rent is the produce on 
inframarginal land), but rather how there may be variations in profit, 
due to variations in the other distributional shares: "It remains for us 
to consider what is the cause of the permanent variations in the rate of 
profit" (ibid., p. 110). Specifically, as the margin of cultivation is ex-
tended under accumulation and popUlation growth, the duties imposed 
on corn imports make inferior land necessary to production. More 
labor is required to produce a given quantity of com upon new land, 
the labor value of com relative to manufactures is higher, and profits 
are lower. At the same time, rents increase, "first, because produce 
would be of a higher value, and secondly, because [landlords] would 
have a greatly increased proportion of that produce" (ibid., p. 125), 
since while wages increase in terms of the value of com, laborers are 
no better off in real terms, still receiving only the "food and necessar-
ies" required for reproducing their labor. . . 
This much of Ricardo's analysis is familiar. For further tUumma-
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tion, the argument can be re-approached from the perspective of an 
exchange between two different sectors of production, one paying rent 
and one not, or simply as an exchange between corn and manufactures 
(we might assume manufacturers pay corn wages). First, however, 
how did Ricardo understand the exchange between two similar sectors 
of production, neither of which pays rent? Here he departed from 
what Smith and many others of his time believed in insisting that any 
extension or limitation of the exchange between like manufacturing 
sectors accompanied by improvements in labor productivity was with-
out effect on the profits of either sector. Possessing a more sophisti-
cated view of commodity values than Smith's adding-up view permit-
ted, Ricardo concluded that were costs of production to fall with an 
increased division of labor and extension of exchange between manu-
facturing sectors, profit residuals would remain unaffected, because 
commodity values would fall proportionately to any fall in costs of 
production. 
Questions arise, however, when one turns to exchange between a 
sector paying rent and one not. Here the extension or limitation of 
exchange (due to the extension or withdrawal of the margin of cultiva-
tion) has definite repercussions on profits. The Principles tells us that 
as cultivation is extended and exchange increases, profits fall while 
rents increase. Alternatively, then, should cultivation be reduced and 
exchange be limited, profits should rise and rents decrease. Yet it is 
not immediately obvious why this should be so. According to Ricar-
do's view of profit as a residual, profits rise when a greater residual 
sum of value is left to capitalists upon the exchange of manufactures 
and corn. But if withdrawal of the margin of cultivation reduces the 
value of corn, it would seem that the lower cost of that input should 
lead to a proportionate fall in the value of manufactures produced with 
that input, as in the case of the effects of labor productivity gains in 
exchange between manufactures. This in turn would preclude any 
increased profit residual, and undermine Ricardo's claims regarding 
the relationship between rents and profits. 
Scholars, of course, have historically focused on what extension of 
the margin of cultivation meant for profits in Ricardo's argument. 
This seems to have accorded an inherent plausibility to his analysis of 
rents and profits, since a higher wage-corn cost of production, with a 
given labor productivity in manufactures, should surely squeeze prof-
its. However, it also seems to have deflected attention from the case 
where withdrawal of the margin of cultivation reduces the wage-corn 
cost of production, and from the question of whether potentially in-
creased profit residuals would be competed away, leaving no gain in 
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profits to ~ccompany the. fall in rents. Ironically, it is probably fair to 
say that RIcardo was chIefly interested in seeing a contraction of the 
margin of cultivation (through an end to the com laws), and that his 
stagnationist views were essentially alarmist in nature. How then mig~t this puzzle of increased profit residuals be explained? The fol~ 
lowmg represents one way in which the matter might be addressed. 
Suppose the margin of cultivation is withdrawn, say, on account of 
free com imports. Since the commodity values of manufactures must 
be proportional to their cost of production, manufacturing capitalists 
could indeed find themselves possessed of an increased residual in the 
exchange for com were they be able to purchase com at a price below 
its value, while continuing to market their own manufactures as if com 
were at its value. The increased residual would then be the difference 
between the price paid to farmers for com and its value. Moreover, 
since farmers (with whom manufacturers exchange) must still, as capi-
talists, recoup a value for com proportional to its cost of production, 
they might, for reasons to yet be explained, reduce rent payments to 
landlords to make up the shortfall on com sales, thus effecting the 
transfer of rents from landlords to capitalists as increased profit residu-
als that Ricardo would have associated with a withdrawal of the mar-
gin of cultivation. 
Such an account raises questions of its own. In the first place, if 
manufacturers purchase com at a price below its value and cost of 
production, why would they continue to market their own commodities 
at a value proportional to the natural value of com, rather than at a 
value proportional to the price actually paid for com? Arguably, the 
cost of production of manufactures is simply lower in this circum-
stance, so that the value of manufactures should adjust downward 
under competition, and profit residuals would then be unchanged. Yet 
whether manufacturers correspondingly reduce the value of their com-
modities depends upon whether they believe the lower price paid for 
com is temporary or permanent, or in Ricardo's terms, whether com 
sells at a lower market price or the natural value of com obtains. If it 
is the market price, and should the natural value of com be expected 
to reassert itself at some later point in time, then manufacturers would 
be correct to set the value of manufactures at a level proportional to 
the true value of com-its natural value--thus temporarily earning in-
creased profit residuals until that time that they must again pay a pri:e 
for corn equal to its natural value. Moreover, in the circumstances m 
which the margin of agricultural production is bein~ ~ithdrawn, . ~e 
value of com is itself falling with rising labor productmty, so that It IS 
not unreasonable to suppose that, for a time, market forces drive down 
, , 
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the price of com faster than does rising labor productivity drive down 
its value. When finally the margin of agricultural production is again 
stable, then market forces adjust to the com cost of production, and 
the price of com equals its value. Only in the interim, then, could 
manufacturers be said to earn increased profit residuals. 
A second question concerns the obligations of tenant farmers to 
landlords. How is it possible that the former simply reduce their pay-
ments to the latter, in order to make up temporary shortfalls in com 
cost of production? Ricardo is certainly clear that rent is paid accord-
ing to the differential productivity of marginal and infra-marginal 
lands, so that tenants were presumably constrained in the adjustments 
they could make should com prices fall faster than com values. Ac-
cordingly, though it may be possible to explain the appearance of prof-
it residuals in manufacturing in terms of a discrepancy between market 
price and value, it appears problematic that rents could be transferred 
to profits to permit this. Here, Ricardo's opinion about the special 
character of a sector of production in which rent is paid points toward 
a solution to these difficulties. As suggested above, agriculture is 
unique for Ricardo in that land was not fully a commodity in early 
nineteenth century England. Thus, though landlords could expect to 
be paid rent on a differential productivity basis, it can be argued that 
they would not be able to determine, in the interim transitional period 
during which the margin is contracting, whether tenants actually do 
maintain such rent payments. Since each landlord possessed limited 
parcels of land which were. almost certainly discontinuous in differen-
tial productivity, it would not be easy to establish how fast rents ought 
to fall across parcels without comparing intermediate parcels in the 
possession of other landlords. Without a fully developed market for 
land, this sort of comparison was unlikely made, especially since each 
landlord had but his own tenants' marketing information to gauge how 
fast com values were falling, and thus how fast rents should fall. 
Should, then, com prices actually be falling faster than com values, 
landlords would expect a decline in rents that unbeknownst to them 
exactly allowed for the deviation of com prices below com values, 
thus effecting the transfer of rents to profits. 
It should be added that tenant farmers would themselves also be 
unaware of the transfer involved. They would not have reason to be-
lieve that com prices were falling faster than com values, since they 
would only perceive changes in the relative prices of com and manu-
factures. While com prices (and values) are falling with the withdraw-
al of the margin, the prices of manufactures (and their values) are also 
falling as rising labor productivity in agriCUlture lowers the cost of 
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produ~tion in manu~actures. Farmers, then, cannot distinguish whether 
the pnces they receIve for com are falling faster than the prices they 
pa~ for manufactures, or whether the prices they pay are falling less 
qUIckly than the prices they receive. In either event, the upshot is that 
the cost of production of com is not falling as fast as would be the 
case were com prices not to deviate below com values, while it is this 
perceived fall in the com cost of production that guides the decrease in 
rents. Indeed, it is highly unlikely that farmers would even have rea-
son to suspect the deviation, since their shortfalls are made good by 
the reduction in rents. 
This analysis clearly goes beyond what Ricardo argued in the Prin-
ciples. Its strategy of interpretation is to integrate his naturalistic cost 
of production account of commodities and labor with his more social-
historical view of the distributional shares of capitalists and landlords 
by emphasizing the incomplete commodity status of land. In the nine-
teenth century, however, land was soon to become fully traded in the 
manner of other commodities, and this presumably would ultimately 
have eliminated the transfer described above as a source of residual 
profits. As it turned out, another historical development, the changing 
importance of machinery and fixed capital in production, stimulated 
Ricardo in the last edition of the Principles to re-consider elements of 
his original views, and this re-thinking arguably overturned, at least 
implicitly, his original conclusions regarding distribution. Thus, the 
question that remains is whether it is possible to apply the argument 
about profits above in the new distributional framework of the third 
edition. 
III. THE DISTRIBUTIONAL ACCOUNT OF TIlE THIRD 
EDITION 
How did the addition of the chapter on machinery to the third edi-
tion of the Principles reverse the conclusions regarding income shares 
that Ricardo reached in his first two editions? The introduction of 
machinery in production, or the replacement of circulating capital by 
fixed, because it precludes a rise in wages from a rise in th.e va!u~ of 
com, allows capitalists to maintain their net incomes despIte hmt~ed 
land and a rising population. Since the reduction in circulating capital 
results in the decline of national or gross income, the fact that net 
income is unchanged implies that the share of profits i? gross inco~e 
increases. Rather than the accumulation of capital leadmg to a declIn-
ing share of profits in gross income, Ricardo's machinery chapter 
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analysis indicates that exactly the opposite can be expected. 
The impact of the machinery chapter on the original argument of the 
Principles is perhaps most manifest in terms of the new role rent must 
assume. Though the added chapter does not change the manner in 
which rent is determined, rent ceases to be inverse to profits. Quite 
simply, if capitalists are always able to replace circulating capital with 
fixed, the demand for labor never increases, and neither wages nor the 
value of com can increase. The margin of cultivation is consequently 
never extended, and rents no longer increase with accumulation and 
the growth in population. In effect, the perfect substitutability of fixed 
for circulating capital places a ceiling on wages by expelling labor 
from production as fast as the demand for circulating capital might 
increase with accumulation. With less than perfect substitutability, the 
demand for labor would indeed rise as accumulation increases the 
demand for circulating capital, though it is fair to suppose that the 
availability of foreign com combined with the lesser growth rate of 
circulating capital associated with some substitution would fundamen-
tally retard the growth of wages. In any event, then, rents would oc-
cupy a declining share of national income. 
In contrast, the added chapter on machinery implicitly produces an 
altogether new conception of wages in the Principles. In the chapter, 
Ricardo begins by allowing that his former position on the impossibili-
ty of technological unemployment is mistaken, so that labor may well 
find itself unemployed when displaced by machinery. This admission 
clearly disrupts the cost of production-Say's Law treatment of wages 
of the first two editions. That is, while the Say's Law handling of 
other commodities remains in force in the third edition, such that com-
modities found in excess supply in one market are quickly channeled 
as "savings" into production in other markets as "investments," labor 
in excess supply, is not similarly reallocated. Since its cost of produc-
tion is thus not recouped, Say's Law and Ricardo's cost of production 
approach to value can only jointly be preserved at the expense of sac-
rificing the cost of production interpretation of the determination of 
wages. 
Ricardo does go to some length in the added chapter in attempting 
to account for labor's possible reemployment, particularly in private 
and public services, as if to suggest that his original conception of 
wages is still appropriate. Nonetheless, as long as technological unem-
ployment is admitted to exist (which was the purpose of the chapter's 
addition to the Principles), full reemployment is clearly ruled out. 
Indeed, why would Ricardo have declared the introduction of machin-
ery to create unemployment were that unemployment fully canceled by 
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reem'pl.o~~e~t? In. fact, Ricardo's attention to labor's reemployment 
posslbl~lhes lts~lf slgn~ls a fundamental change in his conception of 
wages m that his allowmg there exists a role for social debate over how 
labor is to be reemployed implies that wage determination has become a 
social matter, rather than simply a function of natural cost of production 
conditions. It is only in the third edition of the Principles, then, that the 
custo~ary or habitual element present in the determination of wages 
noted m the first two editions becomes significant. 
This emphasis upon a social element in wage determination is espe-
cially clear in the latter half of the added chapter where Ricardo dis-
cusses broad policy perspectives for the reemployment of displaced 
laborers. Indeed, that such reemployment is anything but a strictly 
natural affair is made particularly clear by his willingness to countenan-
ce a social debate over labor's reemployment in which laborers them-
selves are tentatively offered some say in reaching a consensus on which 
possibilities ought to be pursued, albeit within the constraint of final 
decision made by earners of net income. "Independently of the consid-
eration of the discovery and use of machinery ... the laboring class have 
no small interest in the manner in which the net income of the country 
is expended, although it should, in all cases, be expended for the gratifi-
cation and enjoyment of those who are fairly entitled to it" (Ricardo I, 
p. 392). Thus, should the wages and conditions of employment in, say, 
menial service be preferred to the wages and conditions of employment 
in military service, laborers are invited to express this preference for 
reemployment, assuming of course that those receiving the net income 
that is to be spent on such reemployment are indifferent between the 
alternative forms of expenditure. 
That wage determination is fundamentally a social matter, however, 
need not imply only that the level of wages is itself determined in 
social debate. The customary or habitual element in the determination 
of the "food and necessaries" requisite for employment can still be 
said to establish a relatively unchanging level of wages, while the 
social dimension underlying this determination could alternatively be 
said to involve a pattern of social practices among laborers for the 
utilization of these food and necessaries. The social dimension to 
wage determination, on this view, would be more a matter of how well 
laborers made use of a given level of compensation in maintaining 
their ability to labor. In effect, the social organization of l~borers 
outside capitalist production can be understood to vary acn:ss dlffere~t 
individuals and/or groups of individuals such that, accordmg to their 
domestic and community modes of organization, different laborers 
apply the wage and implied food and necessaries with different de-
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grees of skill or success for their respective maintenance for employ-
ment. From this perspective, some laborers would be able to procure 
their maintenance at the ruling wage without entirely exhausting the 
food and necessaries received in the wage, while other laborers would 
but be able to procure their maintenance at the ruling wage by just 
exhausting the food and necessaries received for the wage. The for-
mer would effectively earn rents on the cost of production of maintain-
ing their labor, while the latter would find themselves maintaining 
their labor at the margin of labor production. Better quality social 
organization, then, can be said to earn differential productivity rents in 
labor production just as better quality land does in agricultural produc-
tion. 
While Ricardo did not, of course, elaborate this reformulation of 
wage determination as reflecting this sort of social component, the 
account here captures the tenor of his thinking regarding differential 
rent. It also allows the interpretation of profits residuals above in 
connection with exchange between a sector earning rent and one not to 
be re-applied in the third edition of the Principles. Thus, analogously 
to the account above, a Ricardian theory of profit in the third edition 
would require that there similarly be an input to the production of 
labor which is not fully a commodity, much in the same way land was 
not fully a commodity in com production. Residual profits would then 
result as before since capitalists would be able to acquire labor at a 
price below its value and cost of production when the extent of ex-
change between capital and labor is decreasing, thus in effect extract-
ing a rent on labor production that is transferred to profits by the tem-
porary deviation of labor's price below its value and cost of produc-
tion. The continued substitution of machinery for labor on this argu-
ment would effectively produce the withdrawal of the margin of "cul-
tivation" of labor, just as the availability of imported com brought 
about the withdrawal of the margin in domestic agriculture. 
The social organization of laborers thus functions as the input to 
labor production which, unlike food and necessaries, is not a commod-
ity. This input of course is not tangible in the manner of land in com 
production, and it is also not clear which individuals might be thought 
analogous to tenant farmers in labor families and communities. Still, 
labor's social organization is certainly no less constitutive of labor 
production than land is in the production of com. Further, just as 
there is no reason to assume that land is homogeneous in quality, so 
there is just as little reason to assume that social organization among 
different groups of laborers is homogeneous in quality. Some families, 
for example, simply make better use of commodities in their produc-
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tion of I.abor in virtue of their family organization than do others. 
Those wIth this advantage accordingly require less commodities than 
do t~ose less productive in this regard, and thus effectively earn com-
modIty rents on labor production, despite the fact that their social or-
g~niz~tion~1 input is not itself quantifiable in commodity terms. In the 
thl~kmg RIcardo used in first two editions, then, those families earning 
social organizational rents are inframarginal labor producers. In con-
trast, those families at the very margin of labor production set the 
level of the wage relative to the demand for circulating capital at la-
bor's commodity cost of production. 
Analogously to Ricardo's analysis of rents and profits in the first 
two editions of the Principles, the third edition analysis of the Princi-
ples sets up an account of profits that makes rents to labor production 
the source of new profits. Specifically, just as in the first two editions 
the replacement of domestic com by foreign com reduces the demand 
for the former, thus permitting the withdrawal of the domestic margin 
of agricultural production, so in the third edition the introduction of 
machinery substitutes fixed capital for circulating, thus withdrawing 
the margin of labor production and lowering the demand for labor. 
Marginal less efficient producers of labor are accordingly eliminated 
from employment in capitalist production, and the value of labor falls 
as the higher productivity of formerly infra-marginal labor producers 
comes to dictate the new location of the margin and the value of labor. 
Should, accordingly, the transition period to the new, lower value of 
labor be characterized as one in which for a time the price of labor is 
falling faster than the value of labor, then labor producers experiencing 
shortfalls on the cost of production of labor wiII reduce rent contribu-
tions in the interim, thus effecting the transfer from rents to profits 
displayed in Ricardo's initial reasoning. 
Again, capitalists establish their own cost of production according to 
the value they must ultimately pay for labor, and not according to its 
price temporarily below value in the transition to the new margin, so 
that residual profits result from the deviation of prices below values. 
Producers of labor, on the other hand, are even less likely to recognize 
the reduction in rents to social organization and the consequent rise in 
profits than landlords and/or tenant farmers in the analysis of the first 
two editions. First, it is obviously not the case that two separate 
groups negotiate differential productivity rents, as do tenants and land-
lords who proceed by contract, both because the social organization 
input responsible for rents is so highly intangible, and because the 
social organization of laborers is established upon affective, custom-
ary, and normative grounds which traditionally lack commodity dimen-
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sions. Secondly, as with tenant farmers in the first two editions, that 
the improved productivity of capitalist commodities reduces their val-
ues as the cost of labor production falls makes it difficult for those 
marketing labor to determine whether the price of labor is falling fast-
er than rising labor productivity, or whether the values of "food and 
necessaries," the commodity inputs to labor production, are falling less 
quickly than the value of labor. Again, relative prices are all that the 
producers of labor have to go on, and the political economists that did 
take up labor's cause in mid-century England, the Ricardian socialists, 
were not equal to the task of distinguishing the possibilities at hand, 
nor explaining the input characteristics of social organization. 
It is worth emphasizing, then, that the barrier to profit creation that 
emerges in the context of Ricardo's original argument, namely, the 
increasing commodification of land and landlords' likely improved 
understanding of possible deviations between corn prices and values, 
lacks an apparent analogue in the framework of the third edition of the 
Principles. Social relationships outside of capitalist production are 
particularly resistant to analysis in commodity terms, so that as long as 
labor production remains highly differentiated by social organization (a 
matter likely in times of migration from semi-capitalist to fully capital-
ist spheres of production), the continual introduction of labor-replacing 
machinery offers the promise of additions to the profit residual through 
a drawing down of social organizational rents. Ricardo, then, rather 
than the author of the dismal science, should be better thought the 
quintessential voice of optimism for capitalism. Should technological 
advance in fixed capital be a function of continued accumulation, the 
substitution of fixed for circulating capital would always be possible, 
and thus no barriers apparently exist to capitalist growth. 
IV. RICARDO'S GENERAL THEORY OF PROFITS 
The general theory of profits that emerges across the three editions 
of Ricardo's Principles combines an analysis of commodity residuals 
with the assumption that rents and profits are inverse to one another. 
Ricardo's account of commodity values allows a distinction between 
natural values and market prices, and this distinction is employed here 
to explain the exchange between manufactures and corn in the first 
two editions, and then between manufactures and labor in the third, so 
as to account for the creation of profits in terms of the deviation of 
market prices from natural values during the contraction of exchange. 
Profits on this view are a transfer of rents when those exchanging 
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commodities, com or labor, for manufactures receive temporarily re-
duced rents, a result that goes essentially undetected due to the incom-
plete commodity status of the inputs to com and labor production. 
The general theory of profit that appears in the two distributional 
accounts of the Principles can be summarized in its most basic terms 
by focusing on the difference between a sector of production in which 
all inputs are paid according to their own cost of production and one 
in which some inputs are not so rewarded. In the former instance, 
namely, capitalist manufactures in the analysis above, all identifiable 
inputs necessary for the production of output are purchased themselves 
as commodities. All inputs, then, have a determinate cost of produc-
tion in Ricardo's sense as a labor value established objectively in the 
market by the "difficulty of production," and manufacturers, accord-
ingly, must recoup a determinate value in marketing their output, in 
order to remain competitive with other capitalists, given the free flow 
and mobility of capital. In the latter instance, in contrast, namely that 
of either com production or labor production, it is not the case that all 
inputs to production are purchased as commodities, since neither land 
nor social organization, inputs to com and labor production respective-
ly, are fully developed as commodities. These inputs thus lack a de-
terminate cost of production or a labor value established objectively 
in a competitive market, and consequently those involved in this sort 
of production are neither obliged to recoup a determinate value, nor 
are indeed necessarily aware that, from the point of view of capitalist 
commodity production, there exists an implicit cost of production to 
the input they provide indirectly in exchange. In sum, the two sectors 
in question might be characterized, respectively, as fully valorized and 
incompletely valorized sectors of production to distinguish whether or 
not all inputs to production are purchased as commodities. 
Profits for Ricardo, therefore result from exchange between fully 
and incompletely valorized sectors of production. On average, capital-
ists can only trade when they restore their cost of production or earn 
positive profits. In contrast, those in incompletely valorized sectors of 
production, because they possess inputs which need not be purchased, 
may continue to exchange with capitalists though the value of what 
they receive is less than the cost of production of what they provide. 
Indeed, those in this special position do draw down their stock of non-
commodity inputs in some fashion. In Ricardo's theory, this is a mat-
ter of rent payments falling below the level at which they wo~l~ be 
paid if residual profits did not emerge, whether we speak of tradItIonal 
agricultural rents to landlords in the first two editions of the Princi-
ples, or of the social organizational rents associated with certain 
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groups of laborers in the third edition. Presumably, then, at some 
point the persistence of positive profits, with the concomitant transfer 
of rent to capitalists, has some impact upon those in the incompletely 
valorized sector. Ricardo, however, does not begin to examine the 
effect, since his entire emphasis rests upon the fate of profits. 
It should also be noted that Ricardo does little more than consider 
the possibility that rents will fall and so create profits. Though it was 
his intuition that there was something unique in the trade between 
capitalists and landlords, he himself did little more than set out the 
boundaries of an interaction in the market between the fully valorized 
capitalist sector of production in which no rent was paid and that capi-
talist yet incompletely valorized sector in agriculture in which it was. 
That is, that the tenant paid a rent on a basis other than his cost of 
production meant that were it possible that rents fell faster than the 
reduction in difficulty production through withdrawal of the margin, 
then profits would result when capitalists in fully valorized sectors, for 
example, manufacturing, exchanged commodities with the incomplete-
ly valorized sector. Empirically. speaking, however, it seemed accept-
ed in Ricardo's time by many that as stock accumulated and the popu-
lation grew rents would swallow up an increasing share of national 
income. Conversely, then, if the margin of cultivation were withdrawn 
by any means, profits could be expected to take an increasing share of 
national income. Ricardo, thus, sought an explanation for these more 
than proportionate changes in distribution for given changes in the 
extent of trade. That rents, then, were not paid on a cost of production 
basis meant that land was an input of special character in com produc-
tion, so that trade with this sector on the part of those sectors of pro-
duction where no such input existed possessed unique opportunities for 
the creation of profits. Ricardo concluded, as rents fall, profits rise. 
In the third edition, focusing on the relationship between laborers 
and capitalists, Ricardo only began to grope toward the explanation of 
another source of profit. While again it was not entirely clear how the 
exchange of labor for subsistence commodities resulted in profit cre-
ation, nonetheless the admission of technological unemployment re-
vealed new possibilities to Ricardo in the determination of wages. 
Thus, since the precedent for analysis of distribution on an other than 
cost of production basis had been established in the initial formulations 
of the profit theory of the first two editions, it is fair to complete the 
details of an exchange between a fully valorized capitalist sector and 
an incompletely valorized labor production sector, and to term the 
resUlting account Ricardian. Specifically, the analysis of a social orga-
nizational rent, while not elaborated by Ricardo in any way whatsoev-
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er, still issues from the intuition that those earning rents might find 
the~selves rewarded differently from those providing inputs to pro-
ductIon on a cost of production basis. That is, the very possibility that 
wages might be paid below the cost of production of labor at the mar-
gin was created when Ricardo glimpsed the fact that technological 
unemployment placed the compensation of labor on a new footing than 
had been the case in the argument of the first two editions of the Prin-
ciples. 
These conclusions, it should be recalled, derive from reading into 
the Principles two distinct distributional accounts, a project made pos-
sible by analysis of the impact of the added machinery chapter on the 
original distributional conception of the Principles. Scholars by and 
large have not identified tensions between the first two and the third 
edition of the Principles, and have accordingly not thought it neces-
sary to account for problems in the development of Ricardo's thinking. 
Operating on the assumption that there are such problems in his 
thought, the argument here has attempted to explain how change and 
adjustment in his understanding of wages might be consistent with a 
relatively unchanging cost production view of value and general theory 
of profits. It is thus this combination of changed thinking and un-
changing commitment to old ideas that, from the perspective of two 
distinct contexts, suggests the investigation of exchange between com-
pletely and incompletely valorized sectors of production. 
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